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 The Gender Blindness of Good Theorists: An Israeli Case Study 
 
By Henriette Dahan-Kalev 
 
This article began life as a lecture at a conference that celebrated the 20th 
anniversary of the publication of Shlomo Swirskis book Lo Nechshalim Ela 
Menuchshalim: Nituah Sociology Vesihot Im Peeilim Upeeilot (literal translation - 
Not Naturally Inept But Socialized to be Inept: A sociological Analysis and 
Discussions with Social Activists Both Men and Women)1. The publication of this 
book was a landmark in the history of Israeli Sociology in that in it Swirski put 
forward an interpretation and analysis of Israeli society that contradicted that which 
was put forward by those who belong to the Israeli sociological establishment2. Until 
Swirski Israeli sociologists attempted to explain the ineptness and lack of success of 
the Mizrahim3 in Israeli society as being a direct result of their coming from Arab and 
Muslim countries. In his book Swirski offered a Marxist class analysis of their 
situation and showed that their so-called ineptness was a direct result of institutional 
arrangements and discriminatory policies. In doing this Swirski was the first 
sociologist to give expression to the Mizrahi view of their own situation that had 
previously been ignored 4   Swirski, the sociologist and the man, is concerned with 
many marginalized groups in the Israeli state. This shows itself not only in his 
academic work but also in the social action in which he is engaged. Swirski has been 
active in the initiation of many social projects amongst which was the foundation of 
the Kedma School (in which I also had the honor to participate). This school was 
founded to teach children that the national educational system had given up on. In the 
Kedma School many did, what they did not do, in their previous schools  learn - and 
many of them also excelled in their learning.  
In this article I shall use Swirskis book as a sounding board for a theoretical 
discussion about issues of marginality and gender in Israeli society. The first thing I 
want to do is to draw your attention to the subtitle of Swirskis book.  There he writes 
about both male and female activists. (In Hebrew, unlike in English, there is a 
different word for activists of each gender). This shows that when the book was 
published in 1981, that Swirski was sensitive to gender issues even though then it was 
not the politically correct thing to do so. Swirski displays this gender sensitivity 
throughout his book in that he never simply talks about for example, physicians and 
teachers but about male physicians and female physicians and male teachers and 
female teachers. However, with all this gender sensitivity Swirski failed in his 
explanation of the so-called ineptness of Mizrahim, to distinguish Mizrahi women 
from Mizrahi men. This is so even though in his book he discussed occupations and 
professions where most of the workers are Mizrahi women. It is clear that he seems to 
believe that his analysis and explanation of the ineptness of Mizrahi men applies 
equally to Mizrahi women. This to me is a shortcoming of Swirskis analysis in that it 
exhibits what feminist theorists refer to as gender blindness.  
My aim, in what follows, is to discuss a number of issues connected with 
gender blindness that are prevalent in sociological studies about Israeli society. 
Namely: (1) what is the sociological manifestation of the phenomenon referred to as 
gender blindness? (2) Why is it that women are often excluded in theoretical analysis? 
(3) Why is it that women are marginalized either intentionally or accidentally? (4) 
What are the causes of womens invisibility and transparency? 
 I draw attention immediately to the fact that in the previous paragraph I have 
used a number of different words such as invisibility, blindness, exclusion and 
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 marginalization that are often not distinguished. This to me is a mistake. For 
example when an invisible group is discriminated against, than those discriminating 
against it are unaware that they are engaged in discriminating against that group 
because they are unaware of the existence of the group as an identifiable group. The 
use of the word 'exclusion' implies an active form of discrimination  a form of 
discrimination that can only be practiced by people who can identify and recognize as 
members of the group the people they wish to exclude from participating in some 
activity or receiving some benefit. Failure to note what is implied by the uses of these 
different words will lead to a failure not only to understand the phenomenon being 
analyzed but also to identify and describe it correctly. For example, the Israeli 
establishment discriminates against both Arab citizens of the state of Israel and 
foreign workers in Israel. However, the causes for their discrimination are different in 
the sense that the Israeli establishment is officially blind to the plight of the foreign 
workers while it discriminates against Israeli Arabs by actively excluding them from 
enjoying many opportunities and rights that are open to Jewish citizens of the state of 
Israel. In other words while it makes sense to talk about the marginalization of Israeli 
Arabs being a result of policy of exclusion this is not so with regard to the foreign 
workers whose invisibility is a direct result of that they are officially blind to Israeli 
policy makers. Uses of these words also has important theoretical implications as the 
different words imply both different political and sociological circumstances, and so 
different social positions of the groups one is using these words to talk about. In his 
book Swirski correctly draws attention to the underclass position of Mizrahim as well 
as to their low economic and social status; but he fails to draw attention to their 
identity as Orientals which is what distinguishes them from Jews of European and 
American origins. Similarly he also excludes from his analysis factors pertaining to 
gender.  In this sense Swirski failed in his analysis to see and understand the special 
plight of Mizrahi women in Israel, and so with regard to this issue, his book was no 
different than that written by most members of the Israeli sociological establishment. 
Some of the clues for understanding the causes for the gender blindness of Swirski 
and other Israeli sociologists can be found in the writings of feminist theorists. And so 
what I do in this article is to use ideas of some feminist theorist in order to uncover 
the gender blindness that Swirski exhibits in his book. My focus in this essay is not 
the feminist ideas themselves  and so I do not engage in a critical discussion of them 
and I am very brief in my explanation of them5. My aim is to use these ideas to 
uncover the gender blindness of an extremely good sociological theorist whose work I 
greatly admire. 
Diane Coole, in her book Women in Political Theory6, gives us a perceptive 
analysis of the nature of womens invisibility in classical political theory. She shows 
that the universalistic mode of expression that is commonly found in the classical 
works of political philosophy contributes to rendering women invisible. Coole shows 
that in books like John Lockes Second Treatise on Government in which he claims 
that all men are born equal and in doing so he presumes and is presumed to be using 
the word men to also bespeaking about women, where in point of fact, he excludes 
them. She argues that although the abstract use of the word men is meant to include 
women, and may even do so as it concerns their entitlements for rights, for Locke, 
women as women remain transparent. She claims this because she identifies in 
Lockes writings specific references to women that show that they and their special 
needs are invisible to him. Locke, like other classical political theorists such as Mill, 
Hegel and Marx does not refer to women in an abstract and transparent way when he 
is talking about issues that are related to the gender division of labor.  
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 Mill for example in his essay on The Subjection Of Women7 underlines 
womens social roles as to bear children and as being the axle around which the 
family turns. While Mill is in favor of improving the situation of women in 
relationship to that of men, and supports the idea that they should enjoy the same 
rights as do men, including the rights to be educated and the right to own property as 
well as the right to vote, he fails to explain how they can practically do so while still 
being responsible for their roles in the private sphere of running the household and 
bringing up the children. For women to enjoy rights in the public sphere they need to 
be able to play roles in the public sphere. As to how they are supposed to perform 
these roles while still being responsible for bringing up children and running the 
household, Mill is silent. Hence, while Mill does not theoretically limit women to the 
private sphere and claims that they are entitled to the rights that can be enjoyed by 
men in the public sphere, he also makes it clear, they can legitimately enjoy these 
rights only if they do not neglect their responsibilities to their children, their family 
and their household. Then again while Mill claims that women are responsible for the 
private sphere of the household, it is also clear that even for him it is still the men who 
are ultimately in control of it. Many consider Mill to be the founding father of 
feminist liberalism because he claimed that women should not be excluded from the 
public sphere. Now this is all very well as far as it goes but it really does not do 
anything to change the patriarchal order of society. Mill, I am sure thought himself to 
be a progressive thinker, as does Shlomo Swirski. But both of these progressive 
thinkers were largely blind to the real situation of women.  
Hegel also speaks about men in an abstract inclusive fashion. However while 
he is clearly aware of the existence of women he claims that not only do they have no 
rights to take part in the political process he is clearly terrified of what could happen if 
they tried to do so. He does everything he can, as a political theorist, to make sure that 
women stay as far away from the public sphere as possible. In his The Philosophy of 
Right, for example, he writes:  
 
Women may have happy ideas, taste, and 
elegance, but they cannot attain to the ideal. 
 The difference between men and women is like that 
between animals and plants. Men correspond to 
animals, while women correspond to plants because 
their development is more placid and the principle 
that underlies it is the rather vague unity of feeling. 
When women hold the helm of government, the state 
is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their 
actions not by the demands of universality but by 
arbitrary inclinations and opinions. Women are 
educated  who knows how?8 
 
My friend Rakefet Levkowitch-Efrat, who first drew my attention to these remarks of 
Hegel said to me with regard to them: I often think that we feminist scholars must be 
masochists to spend our time dealing with writings like this. Dont you agree? I do 
not agree with her. I believe that feminist scholars cannot afford not to comment on 
remarks such as this from such an influential and important political theorist like that 
of Hegel. Not to comment on remarks such as this is in a sense to affirm them once 
more. When important thinkers such as Mill and Hegel speak of values and rights 
which must be distributed universally to all mankind, women for them become either 
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 a transparent social category or a differentiated social category, that describes women 
instrumentally as child bearers (Hegel) and as the axle around which the family turns 
but never as being suited for government. Hegel goes so far as to assert that the public 
sphere must be protected against women. For him this means that women are to be 
excluded both from government and the military. This is not accidental, for these are 
the spheres where power, authority and public resources are most concentrated. What 
is the cause of Hegels fear of women   or some might say his misogyny  and what 
leads him to exclude them from the public sphere and so to protect the patriarchal 
order are questions that go beyond the scope of this article.9  
The exclusion of women from the public sphere is not only a result of gender 
blindness; it is also a result of class struggle. As a result of this women of the lower 
classes find themselves positioned not only on ranks of the ladder below that of men 
they also find themselves positioned on ranks of the ladder below those of better off 
women. Swirskis writings, and also his social action, have been devoted to social 
groups that have been pressed to the margins. In his book on the inept he concentrated 
on class as the primary cause of marginalization. More than this he devoted space to 
explain the marginalization of women as being a direct result of the distribution of 
labor on gender lines. In the interviews in part two of his book, in the sections that 
deal with the housekeeper10 and kinder garden teacher 11 (pp.275-280), he stresses the 
class aspects of their work which positions them in the margins in the sense that their 
work is labor intensive with low remuneration. From this it follows that as Mizrahi 
men are engaged in labor intensive work with low remuneration then Mizrahi women 
are placed even lower on the ladder than Mizrahi men are, for their income, as is the 
income of women of all identifiable groups, is lower than that of Mizrahi men. These 
conclusions are re-enforced by the findings of the research of Debbie Bernstein12, 
who was also Swirskis co-editor of the journal Mahbarot Lebikoret (Critical 
Notebooks) which was published in the 1970s by the University of Haifa Press. Now 
while, on this analysis, it follows that Mizrahi women comprise not only a different 
category than do Mizrahi men, but also a different category from Ashkenazi women, 
as I shall shortly explain, what is hidden in the Swirski-Bernstein analysis is the part 
played in their positioning on the margins of society by the fact that they are Mizrahi 
women and not simply by the fact that they are Mizrahi. This is a clear expression of 
the phenomenon of the transparency of women as it appears in the writings of Israeli 
sociologists. In this instance the women in question are Mizrahi. The question of the 
lower positioning on the ladder of Mizrahi women than that of Ashkenazi women and 
Mizrahi men is not simply the result of a social arithmetic function which claims that  
a Mizrahi woman = a non-Ashkenazi woman + a non-man. The status and identity 
of women in general is not simply a function of the fact that they are not-men, but is 
also a function of the fact that they are constructed as women in a patriarchal world at 
a certain time and place. Swirski appears to be unaware of fact for on his analysis 
there is no place for a category of Mizrahi women. Swirski works with two 
dichotomies that fail to pick out what is specific to Mizrahi women: the first is the 
Mizrahi/Ashkenazi dichotomy and the second is the men/women dichotomy. His 
fixing on the occupations of kinder garden teacher and cleaning lady as the 
occupations that Mizrahi women are concentrated in fails to explain why Mizrahi 
women congregate in these occupation and why Ashkenazi women and Mizrahi men 
do not. To address that question Swirski would have had to go beyond his Marxist 
analysis and look at Mizrahi women not only as members of a certain socio-economic 
class but also as comprising a social category with their distinctive own 
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 characteristics and this would entail distinguishing Mizrahi women both from Mizrahi 
men and from other Jewish Israeli women.  
Marx, the thinker whose theories provides Swirski with the framework for his 
own analysis of Israeli society, also errs on the issue of gender blindness. Marxs 
analysis leaves very unclear the question of womens liberation. On his view the 
revolution will liberate all proletarians  men and women alike  from their chains. 
However, Marxs analysis fails to cross the threshold to the family home and ignores 
the work done by women in the kitchen, the childrens room and the bedroom. Marx 
does not speak directly about sexual relations or child rearing or household work as 
relationships that help construct the subordinating relations that women have to men. 
While Marx talks a lot about the division of labor in the public sphere he does not talk 
at all about the questions of division of labor in the home, either before, or after, the 
revolution. Some of these tasks are partially performed for Marx by Engles in his 
monograph on The Origin of Family13 and later on by Marxist feminist theorists such 
as Firestone14 Jaggar15 and McKinnon16 and others. McKinnon, for example, claims 
that the place of sexual relations in feminist theory is comparable to the place 
occupied by labor relations in Marx's own theory17. Sexual relations, she claims, have 
as much influence in patriarchal society as Marx claims that labor relations do in 
capitalist society. As labor relations are the source of alienation, exploitation and false 
consciousness in capitalist society, sexual relations are the source of alienation, 
exploitation and false consciousness in patriarchal society. Firestone compares the 
way that the earliest feminist theoreticians dealt with sexuality to the way that Owen, 
Fourier and Babel  thinkers Marx labeled Utopian Socialists - dealt with class18. 
She points out that it is impossible to develop an overall understanding of the 
historical materialistic process simply by concentrating on the class relationships that 
flow from the production process without also taking account of the relationships 
between the sexes. Jaggar claims that Marxs gender blindness is obvious in what he 
say when he talks about the worker struggle, against oppression. While women are 
expected to join the struggle she claims that Marx simply neglected the oppression 
that women suffered in the homes19. Marxs (and Engels) call at the end of 
Communist Manifesto for all the workers of the world [to] unite overlooks both the 
oppression women workers suffer simply because they are women as well as the 
exploitation they suffer at home at the hands of their own husbands, who within the 
household and are not simply only their husbands but also their own personal 
employers. This shows that the male worker who is oppressed and exploited is not 
made immune by this oppression and exploitation from becoming an oppressor and 
exploiter himself. This is a point I would have liked to have seen discussed in 
Swirskis book because it raises in an acute form a problem that arises in connection 
with the claim of some feminist activists that all women should show solidarity 
because being women, they all belong to a group marginalized by men. However, 
history shows that women of the upper classes, who seem to act out of the same 
economic motivations to lower class women, as do their husbands, often exploit 
women of lower classes. In her book, Caroline Ramazanoglu20 shows how capitalists 
interest can undermine feminist solidarity. This is definitely true in Israel where 
Mizrahi women have often found themselves exploited and oppressed by Ashkenazi 
women.  
All the classical political theorists mentioned so far attempted to put forward a 
comprehensive theory of justice. This being the case the question arises: What, 
despite their concerns and sensitivity to questions of equality, justice and their desire 
to overcome exploitation and oppression, cause them to be gender blind? How is it 
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 that a theory which is ostensibly concerned with the justice for all regardless of color, 
creed and sex, and which is consciously inclusive and egalitarian in its intent, is also 
blind to the injustices done to women? Iris Young in her book Justice and The 
Politics of Difference21, Iris Young argues that the cause of this gender blindness is a 
direct result of the attempt of those theorists to put forward a universal conception of 
justice. The attempt to put forward an abstract conception of justice which has 
universal application to all places and at all times, is in Youngs view, the chief 
culprit. All such theories are expressed in concepts that are very abstract because only 
abstract concepts can have universal application. Concepts that are grounded in 
empirical reality are concepts which do not have universal application. This means 
that the universal concepts used to give expression to conceptions of justice in 
classical political theory are at once very general and at the same time very far 
removed from the facts of the real world at any specific time or at any specific place. 
Youngs suggested solution to the problem is that theories of justice should be based 
on empirical data and should give up the hope of being universally applicable. If this 
would be done and theorists of justice would attempt to put forward theories that are 
applicable to certain societies at specific times, that is that their theories would be 
molded to fit the empirical social facts of the specific societies they are talking about. 
If they did this it would be less likely that these theorists would be blind to the 
injustices done to the members of any large group in the specific societies that they 
are talking about. That is to say that Young attempts to collapse the distinction 
between normative theorizing and empirical research. She recommends that 
theorizing be grounded in empirical facts. She wants the theoreticians to theorize 
about specific societies and the people in them. She also claims that until 
theoreticians become aware of the differences between the different positions that 
different groups occupy in the society, as well as the power relationships that hold 
between them, they will have a real understanding these societies. She also wants the 
concepts used by theoreticians to be based on empirical facts. What she does not want 
is that empirical facts be organized and made sense of in according to abstract 
universal concepts. To follow the latter course, as the classical political theorists of 
justice have tended to do has led them to put forward theories which are at once both 
removed from the world and blind to many injustices in it.  
At first sight it seems that Swirski is engaged in the type of research that Young 
talks about. Swirski shows on the basis of empirical how the inequalities that exist in 
the State of Israel between various ethnic groups are re-enforced by institutional 
arrangements that have existed from the beginnings of the State until the 1980s. 
Swirki does not attempt to define an ideal of equality that is theoretically applicable 
to all societies. What he does is identify concrete instances of inequality and these 
examples come largely from his discussions both with workers - male and female - as 
well as with their union representatives from different geographic positions within 
Israel. His discussions with these people took place not only in the center of the 
country but also in the periphery, in development towns, in poor suburbs, both in the 
workers homes and in the places where they earn their low wages. The inequality he 
talks about is the inequality as it is experienced by individuals who are largely 
Mizrahim. This is the source of the importance of Swirskis research for our 
understanding of the so called ineptness, and the exclusion that goes along with it, of 
Mizrahim, as being not the result of some arbitrary invisible hand, but as being the 
result of specific social policies which were deemed to be just and to promote 
equality, according to some abstract universal theory. It is at this point that Swirskis 
research connects with the claims of a conspiracy that Young talks about, when she 
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 quotes Marilyn Frye approvingly, who claims that there is no need for apartheid laws 
for racist relations to exist amongst different racial groups within society22. Ethnic 
differences in Israel are papered over in the nationalist and Zionist discourse about 
the unity of the Jewish people and in the claim that all the Jews are in the same boat. 
However, this discourse, as it is blind to the ethnic discrimination, also functions as 
an obstacle to overcoming it.  
Within the Israeli context this discourse about the unity of the Jewish people 
translates into a claim that all Jewish citizens of the state belong to the Zionist Jewish 
national collective. This claim functions to support and protect the unity of this 
national collective, and so the identities of those Jews whose cultures do not fit the 
stereotype of 'the new Jew' that the Zionists wished to create in the land of Israel, 
were simply not recognized. That is to say, all the cultures that of those Jews which 
failed to stress the Eurocentric modernistic and non-religious values of Zionism were 
simply not given recognition in the public expressions of the Zionist ethos. The 
political and social structures and the processes of socialization encouraged the 
detachment of groups and individuals from the cultures they brought with them from 
the Arab and Muslim countries of origin. These processes of encouraging people to 
break their ties from their culture was never viewed as a form of racism nor even as a 
form of discrimination that was practiced against people on the basis of their ethnic 
origins. Hence, while groups in Israel were marginalized and discriminated against on 
the basis of ethnic membership it was almost impossible to expose it as such because 
the national ethos was simply blind to the existence of these ethnic groups.  
One of the most important things that Swirski did in his research was to expose 
one form of the powerful mechanisms that controls and regulates how this situation of 
exclusion and marginalization works in the area of employment. He showed how the 
mechanisms of the division of labor mirror the economic social and political policies 
to ensure that those whose ethnic origin is Mizrahi will end up working in jobs that 
are labor intensive and for which remuneration is low. Mizrahim, Swirski showed, 
were not marginalized by chance. He shows that their marginalization was the direct 
result of employment policies that were formulated and implemented by those who 
speak and govern in the name of the national unity, and who from an economic point 
of view had the most to gain from it. At the same time other mechanisms were also in 
operation that worked both to marginalize Mizrahim and to detach them from their 
cultural ties. The mechanisms in question were those of socialization that were 
actively encouraged in the educational system as well as in the media. One of the 
aims of these mechanisms was to cope with any criticism that might be expressed by 
those who claim that the treatment of Mizrahim contradicted the talk of unity that is 
expressed in the national ethos. These mechanisms worked so as to create the 
impression that the concept 'Mizrahi' was not recognized to be a real social category. 
When anybody claimed that they were being discriminated against or exploited 
simply because they were Mizrahi they were identified not only as someone who was 
talking nonsense  after all there is no such social group as Mizrahim  but also as a 
trouble maker who wished to undermine the unity of the Zionist Jewish collective as 
it was expressed in the Zionist ideology. That is to say any criticism of the Zionist 
ideology was looked upon as something more than a criticism; it was looked upon as 
an attack upon Zionism, and as such the Zionist leadership who governed the state, 
tended to overreact against any such criticism and in doing so usually exacerbated the 
situation. Hence, the category of Mizrahi was excluded from the public discourse, and 
every attempt to use it in that discourse was immediately identified as a threat to 
Zionism. This in turn led to the exclusion of problems faced by Mizrahim, because 
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 they were Mizrahim, from the Israeli public discourse and so is a contributing factor 
to their marginalization.  
Similar, but even more powerfully   exclusion mechanisms operate to 
marginalize Mizrahi women; they operate once against their Mizrahiness (because 
they are not Ashkenazi) and they operate also against their femininity (because they 
are not men, neither Mizrahi men nor Ashkenazi men). This duality of the exclusion 
mechanism creates a special problem for Mizrahi women when they make demands 
of those who are responsible for their marginalization. The point quite simply is that 
the demands that they make of men are different from the demands they make from 
Ashkenazim and so when they make demands of men (both Ashkenazi and Mizrahi) 
their Mizrahiness tends to be overlooked and when they make demands of 
Ashkenazim (both male and female) their femininity tends to be overlooked. Hence, 
the special social category seems to get lost in the larger social picture. This fact at 
once functions to turn groups like Ashkenazi women and Mizrahi men to play a part 
in marginalizing Mizrahi women and it also helps give credence to the claim that all 
Israeli women are sisters and so they should practice solidarity for they are fighting 
against a common enemy.  
However, as I have already pointed out, this seemingly egalitarian stand papers 
over and so helps to hide, policies of exclusion, exploitation, as well as 
marginalization. When Mizrahi women complain that they are being marginalized, 
discriminated against and are suffering from exclusion they are at once accused of 
threatening either the unity of the larger Mizrahi group or the unity of the feminist 
solidarity. In this Mizrahi women in Israel suffer a fate similar to other so-called 
social transparent groups do in other societies. The claim of the larger group is 
usually that the smaller group is raising irrelevant side issues that threaten the 
ideology of group unity. Experience shows that the ideological mechanisms of the 
claims for unity usually succeed in silencing the claims of the smaller but more 
marginalized group. However, now they are being marginalized by groups who 
belong to the same family of social categories that they do. The extensive literature 
that deals with identity construction is full of references to the problems that are 
connected with what is involved in using one category rather than another to refer to a 
particular group. The point is one category highlights certain features while 
repressing others that another category would not. One such author who writes 
perceptively about this problem from a feministic and cultural pluralistic perspective 
is Elisabeth V. Spelman23.  
In her article The One and The Many Spelman shows how a universalistic 
liberalism blurs the distinction that exists between various essential social categories 
by abstracting the individual from his context and social relationships, and eventually 
leading to the negation of what is specific to the identity of any specific individual or 
groups of individuals. All the different properties that go together to make up the 
identity of specific individuals are not constantly exhibited and visible. Nevertheless, 
those who belong to marginalized social groups find themselves forced to hide parts 
of their identity more than do those who belong to non-marginalized social groups. In 
Israel an Ashkenazi Jewish male does not attempt to hide either his Ashkenaziness or 
his maleness when he moves into the public sphere, whereas an Arab women when 
she moves into the public sphere would tend, as far as possible, to mask her Arabness 
and her femaleness24. Spelman clarifies this situation by using the metaphor of the 
customs hall. She asks us to imagine that when we get to the entrance of the 
customs hall we see that men and women have different doors to go through: The 
green door is for women only while the red door is for men only. Now through each 
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 of these respective doors enter women and men whose other identifiable properties 
are not given any recognition. So, for example, through the green door will enter 
women who had different color skin, those who are poor and those who are rich, 
those who are religious and those who atheists, those who are handicapped and those 
who are non-handicapped, and those who are young and those who are old. The 
differences that are not recognized in the customs hall are very important when it 
comes to the cultural, economic and political identities of women when they step out 
of the customs hall into society at large. Here the fact that a woman is simply not a 
man is not enough to establish who each of them is. It is clear that each womans 
identity is constructed from many different traits and properties, and simply to fix on 
one of them as is done in Spelmans customs hall hides more than it reveals. If the 
custom hall for example was divided not according to gender but according to skin 
color and people would enter through the door that is appropriate to the pigment of 
their skin, what would remain hidden would be not only their gender and the classes 
they belong to and whether they were old or young, religious or not, but everything 
about them apart from the fact as to whether their skin color was light or dark. What 
gets lost in the picture is the positioning of various groups and individual who go to 
make up the larger categories. These groups and people appear in the picture  they 
entered into the customs hall  they simply dont appear there as who they are. Those 
who decided how those who want to enter the customs hall should do so; it is they 
who are responsible for what qualities of people are recognized (and regarded as 
being important and significant) and those qualities which are not to be recognized 
(are regarded as being unimportant and insignificant). The point is that there are 
hegemonic groups that decide what enters the public discourse and what enters into 
the arena of the public agenda. The implications of all this is that those groups and 
individuals who find themselves low down on the social hierarchy will not be helped 
to rise up the ladder by the universal talk about the equality of men and or the 
sisterhood to which all women belong to, for these universalistic categories do not 
recognize as important and significant the qualities that marginalized groups need to 
identify themselves with.  
What Spelman does not write about, but is discussed by such people as Nancy 
Fraser25 and Charles Taylor26, who write about the politics of recognition and the 
politics of identity (identity politics), is the danger that can follow abandonment of 
universalistic values in favor of values of specific group identities. Both Fraser and 
Taylor point to the potential danger of identity politics, namely that the traditional 
hegemonic groups who now control the public sphere by deciding which qualities are 
important and so to be recognized as universal, because they are so powerful will 
know how to utilize the new talk of identity values to protect the power that they 
presently enjoy. Frasers and Taylors message is that it is important not just what is 
said but who it is that is doing the speaking and from what social position he or she is 
speaking. Is this person speaking from the center or from the margins? Is he or she 
speaking from a position of power or from a position of weakness? Is he or she 
speaking as a have or as a have-not? Fraser and Taylor stress that it is important to 
distinguish two types of talk about equality and justice according to who is speaking. 
Is the person speaking a member of the hegemonic group who speaks from the center 
in the name of the common interest of society, or nation, or state, or is he or she a 
person who speaks from the margins when he or she speaks about those self same 
collective values of society, or nation, or state, but is claiming that these values do not 
work to the benefit of all?  
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 Bell hooks, in her book Feminist Theory27 clearly displays how important it is to 
recognize the place that people argue from. What she stresses is that all talk of all 
people is partial no matter where they placed. Those who are placed in the center and 
formerly speak in the name of the state are just as partial in their talk as those who 
talk from the margins. Therefore, as the talk of all people is partial, the talk of no 
particular person is more important than the talk of anyone else. hooks discusses this 
issue in the American feminist context. The agenda of African-American women she 
stresses, time and time again is completely different than that of the white American 
woman. Whereas white women see their agenda as universal and talk of all women 
belonging to one sisterhood but in point of fact their so called universalistic agenda is 
not good for all women but is only good for women who are like themselves. hooks 
refers to Betty Friedans The Feminine Mystique and claims that its principal message 
is that What is good for white women in America is good for all women in the 
world28. In other words to return to the custom hall metaphor the notion of 
solidarity becomes the passport to let all women enter through the green door. But in 
doing so it does not allow us to see the different types of women, those who are 
marginalized, those who are excluded and those who are transparent. hooks 
complaint about white middle class feminists like Betty Friedan, is that although they 
talk for all women and talk in terms of a universalistic feminist agenda, in point of 
fact that they are unaware of the plight of women who are different from them and 
they are also incapable of comprehending the different types of feminist agenda. If 
they know something, they know their own situation and then illegitimately project 
this on to all women and put forward an agenda that is supposed to be universal 
simply on the basis of their own understanding of their own situation. Because they 
are powerful, and because they are highly educated, and because they are articulate 
and have access to the centers of power, then the categories while middle class 
feminists use to talk about womens problems and their feminist agenda, develop a 
hegemonic hold on the public discourse. This situation makes it very difficult for 
transparent and excluded groups of women to be heard in the public domain.  
In his analysis about the ineptness of Mizrahim, Swirski showed in effect that 
the Mizrahim entered the custom hall via the door of national unity. Hence their 
Arabness was played down, it was not seen as something that distinguished them  
essentially from other Jews. Their Arabness was seen as simply an ethnic trait, and 
so marginal to whom they basically were - Jews. The official line was that being 
Mizrahi was simply another way of being Jewish. This enabled the Zionist 
establishment, who were largely Ashkenazi, to deal with the Mizrahim as Jews  in 
this context simply as non-Arabs  and so to ignore their Arabness. This policy 
helped facilitate the social, cultural and political positioning of Mizrahim in the 
Israeli State: being Jews, they were positioned above the Arabs, but being ethnically 
Arab they were positioned below Ashkenazim.  
Whereas in the early days of the State the Zionist discourse functioned in such a 
way as to integrate various groups into Israeli society, later on it no longer succeeded 
in doing so. Today, the public discourse centers around questions not about whether 
Israel is Zionist or not, but about whether a Zionist Israel can be both a Jewish and a 
democratic state while it rules over a large permanent Arab minority29. Part of the 
public discourse today turns on questions of identity, and as such, many groups who 
were previously lumped together within the larger group of Jews are now able to 
speak in their own voice in the public arena. This allows various groups that in the 
past were unable to give voice to their demands to do so now. However this places 
these groups in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, they claim rights which are 
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 supposed to accrue to all citizens simply because they are citizens but which they did 
not enjoy because they were Mizrahim or Arabs or women or handicapped, but on the 
other hand, they demand from the state to treat them as citizens and not to treat them 
as Mizrahim or Arabs or women or handicapped, that is they demand that the state be 
blind to their particular identities. 
The rest of this article will be devoted to the question how can weak social 
groups, oppressed social groups and transparent social groups become empowered 
noticeable and recognized? And more specifically, how is it possible to apply this 
with regard to Mizrahi women?  
Mizrahi women do not comprise a single homogenous category. In terms of 
economics, culture, education and political orientation there is nothing that 
characterizes all Mizrahi women. Unlike other distinct marginal groups such as the 
Ethiopians women, Palestinian-Israeli women and Ultra-Orthodox women, Mizrahi 
women as a group are at once invisible and lack legitimacy in Israel public discourse 
to present themselves as belonging to a distinct social group. This invisible and lack 
of legitimacy is caused by the complicated ethnic political struggle that is as old as 
the Israeli entity itself. Before I can expend on this I need to draw a distinction 
between different types of socially repressed and marginal groups, namely, between 
groups that are legally and theoretically recognized and acknowledged, and those 
groups that are transparent both to the law and to the social theory.  
The constitution writers who were influenced by social contract theory not 
simply to incorporate the abstract universalistic values of these theories into their 
constitutions, but to add details specified to which specific groups the universalistic 
values and principles espoused by the contract theorists would be applied to. For 
example where social contract theorists claimed that all men should be treated 
equally, the constitution writers specified which specific groups of men, and with 
regard to what, they should be treated equally. This finds expression in the 
Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel in the paragraph that states that: 
The State of Israelwill uphold complete social and political equality amongst all 
its citizens without regard to differences of religion, race and gender.30 Why, some 
may ask did not the composers of this declaration simply write the universal claim 
that all people, without any exception, will be treated equally before the law? Why 
when they talked about equality, did they choose to specify that no exceptions would 
only be made because of religion, race and gender and why did they not specify 
also ethnicity and/or nationality, for example? Those who draw up constitutions, as 
well as those who legislate laws are aware that there are certain categories of social 
groups that are weak, and this awareness often leads them to protect them. This 
awareness is also the basis of the justification for policies of affirmative 
discriminative action. I talk about affirmative discriminative action and not 
negative discriminative action because the aim is to correct a wrong done to a 
group, because it has been discriminated against in the past. The aim is to help them 
catch up to others. Justifiable though this type of affirmative action might be, it 
contradicts the universal principle that all people (meaning without exception) 
should be treated equally. The recognition that people in the past suffered from 
discrimination that was connected with their identity that is on the basis of gender 
and/or their color and/or their beliefs, is a step in the direction of justice. However, it 
is also contrary to the universal principle of treating everyone equally. When a 
specific identity trait, like gender, is picked out to justify affirmative action, like it 
was by the Israeli High Court, shows that the Israeli legal system acknowledges that 
women are discriminated against and that this discrimination both needs to stop and 
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 those suffering from it need to be compensated. The same applies to groups like the 
handicapped and the Israeli Arabs, groups that are recognized as deserving legal 
protection. This acknowledgement of these groups by the legal system is what allows 
the claim to be made that there is a state of inequality between men and women, 
between Jews and Arabs and between the handicapped and those who are not 
handicapped. The law here identifies the cause of the inequality, but it also separates 
this cause from those who perpetrate it. This is clear, for example, to anyone who 
reads the High Courts Decision numbers 453/94, 454/94 with regard to women 
sitting on board of directorship as stated in paragraph 2c that as it is both clear and 
easy to understand the universal applicability and obligatory character of the principle 
of equality, what is not clear and easy is to understand why women do not enjoy this 
right. For historical reasons that are related to religious laws and ethnic traditions 
equal treatment for women posed a particular problem until legislature passed the 
Law of Equal Rights for Women (1951), which gave expression, content and legally 
obligated the right that women should enjoy completely equally. (522 c-f) (p.503, 
my emphasis HDK) These words indicate that it is clear that the judges identified 
women as a disadvantaged and discriminated against group and even explicitly 
identified what caused them to be disadvantaged and discriminated against, namely, 
traditions, religions, ethnicity. However, the judges failed to connect these causes to 
any specific groups who are carried out the discrimination. The judge's decision did 
not talk in terms that one identifiable social group is responsible for the 
discrimination suffered by another identifiable social group, and in doing so, the 
judges in effect absolved the discriminating group for responsibility for the 
discrimination which it practices. The decision does not identify men, and or even to 
women of a specific religion or of a specific ethnic group or a specific tradition, that 
they discriminate against women of all other religions, of all other ethnic groups, or 
of all other traditions. This in effect implies that it is only the survived historical relics 
of religions, traditions and ethnicity that they are the causes of the discrimination that 
exists within a contemporary Israeli society that ostensibly values the principle of 
(universal) equality. The decision, by failing explicitly to identify those responsible 
for the discrimination, that is those people groups and institutions that actually carried 
out the acts of discrimination, prevents itself from identifying and punishing those 
responsible for acts of discrimination to those they have wrong. This situation co-
exists with the claim of the Israeli Declaration of Independence recognizing that there 
are specific categories of people that have been discriminated and so need legal 
defense.  
The logic of the Israeli Declaration of Independence is that the law ostensibly 
defends the most weak. For example, that as women, Arabs and the handicapped have 
been discriminated against in the public service by being under represented there, 
affirmative action should now be carried out to secure these groups a fair 
representation. It would seem to follow than that a women who is both Arab and 
handicapped is protected three times by this law and that such women should be well 
represented in the Israeli public service. I am willing to go out on a limb and surmise 
that there is not one woman who is both Arab and handicapped in the Israeli public 
service. What I am certain of is that if there was such a woman she never took the 
public service to court because she was being discriminated against three times 
simultaneously. To classify individuals in society according to a scale of how many 
handicapped groups they belong to as well as to how many privileged groups they 
belong to does not in practice guarantee that those belonging to the handicapped 
groups will be protected. Then again, the system of classification appears to be 
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 completely arbitrary and this holds even for those belonging to the social categories 
the law specifically specifies should be protected. With regard to the people who 
belong to categories that are invisible, that is categories that the law is blind to, and 
does not specify that these people deserve compensation by policies of affirmative 
action, the question of their compensation does not even arise. It is clear is that 
disadvantaged groups that are not recognized by law and in public discourse, are 
groups that are neither protected by Israeli law and are not the beneficiaries of 
policies of affirmative action. This is the fate of Mizrahi women: the law and Israeli 
public discourse is blind to their existence as a social group and so the law does not 
protect them and they are also not the beneficiaries of policies of affirmative actions. 
As I have argued earlier, Mizrahi women fall within two social categories, those of 
Mizrahim and those of women. Many Mizrahi women, like many Mizrahi men, find 
themselves pushed to the margins of Israeli society, excluded and discriminated 
against, over many years by many state institutions, simply because they are Mizrahi.  
According to the liberal legal tradition in order that a Mizrahi woman will be 
recognized by the law, she is required to show that she falls under two conditions 
which results in discrimination: 1) That she has difficulties in enjoying in a manner 
equal to others certain specific resources that are distributed by the state, and 2) And 
the reason she has difficulties in enjoying those specific resources that are distributed 
by the state is because she belongs to the group of Mizrahi women. In this sense 
Mizrahi women are like Ethiopian women and Ultra-Orthodox women but unlike 
Israeli Palestinian women. Women belonging to this last group can come to court and 
claim that they are being discriminated against simply because they are Palestinians 
and/or women as the law is not blind to either group. Frances Raday, in her article 
On Equality31 highlighted how difficult it is in a system of laws that is based on 
liberal principles, for one lone woman to prove that she is suffering from 
discrimination. The difficulty arises from the fact that liberal principles speak in 
terms of the humanity of the person and do not speak of persons in terms of their 
identifying characteristics, such as sex and ethnicity. And so a Mizrahi woman who 
claims that she is being discriminated against because she is who she is, is making a 
claim that liberal theory has difficulty in recognizing. Liberal theory only recognizes 
concrete acts of discrimination that are made against individual people on the basis 
that they are human beings and not because they belong to certain social groups. 
Raday, following Cathrine MacKinnon, emphasizes that the appellant is required to 
prove that the discrimination she has suffered was part of a pattern of discrimination. 
That is to say she is required to prove that there were number of similar incidents of 
discriminations that preceded her in which other women were discriminated because 
they shared common characteristics for example that a certain company consistently 
refuses to employ qualified women because they are women or more specifically, 
because they are Mizrahi women. But until such time that the law is not convinced 
that there is no such pattern the law will be blind to that womans claim. What is 
more, until the law does not recognize that there is such a pattern the chances that 
particular women will be able to convince the court that they are each discriminated 
against because of their identity, are very low.  
Within each society, different individuals display different levels of invisibility. 
The invisibility of different individuals is directly related to whether the 
characteristics by which they identify themselves are recognized both by the law and 
the community. For example foreign workers are recognized by the law simply as a 
pair of working hands: The other aspects of their identity, such as their origin, their 
religion, their culture, is something that Israeli law does not see and so with regard to 
138Journal of International Womens Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003                                                    
 discrimination in these areas it cannot help them. In this respect foreign workers find 
themselves on an equal footing to those social groups in Israel, like Mizrahi women, 
that are not entitled to affirmative action even though they suffer from exclusion and 
discrimination. Lacking legal recognition, the only thing left to those belonging to 
such social groups is to involve themselves in a struggle for their right to define 
themselves as they themselves see fit and not the hegemony be it the ruling class or 
the law.  
Chantal Mouffe, in her article Feminism Citizenship and Radical Democratic 
Politics32 has written about the fight against the hegemonic power that women need 
to undertake as being the only option for their liberation. While in her article, The 
Question of Identity33 she writes about the struggle of women to articulate their own 
political identity. For Mouffe marginalized groups must engage in a political struggle 
to establish their own identity, a process that involves amongst other things liberation 
from what she calls hegemonic articulation. Engaging in a political struggle begins 
a process that involves the reconstruction of identity that moves the subject from 
holding arbitrary positions that contribute to his or her oppression. For example, a 
battered woman, engaged in political struggle will reconstruct her identity as a 
feminist, and this lead her to give up adhering to the position that a battered woman 
deserves being beaten. The political struggle for women, involves a process of 
transformation from accepting positions of subordination as well as the things that 
follow from it. Feminist politics for Mouffe, is a struggle of women to remove 
themselves from the swamp of different connotations of subordination they find 
themselves trapped in. This struggle she sees, has to go along with and is a part of the 
struggle against all types of oppression. The payoff for women begins only when they 
are recognized as a legitimate social group and so are transformed from being 
invisible to being visible.  
The subordination of Mizrahi women in this sense begins as soon as they enter 
the customs room either through the door labeled Mizrahim or through the door 
labeled Women. No matter which door they go through certain aspects of their 
identity, of their humanity, and of what is unique to their life experiences fail to be 
recognized and so are in practice invisible. This is so even when their plight is 
discussed in contexts of discrimination as in Swirskis book and certainly in the 
Israeli High Courts decisions concerning affirmative action (see Israeli High Courts 
Decision no. 453-454, 1994), and the Reform of the Law passed by the Knesset in the 
December 2000 concerning the nomination of women to boards of directors and their 
representation in the higher ranks of the public service34  in all these Mizrahi women 
are not identified as such.  John Rajchman in his introduction to a collection of essays 
Identity In Question refers to an article by Stanley Aronowitz in which he discusses 
the problems that the minority creates for the hegemonic group in society when they 
fight for the legitimate recognition of their own identity. Rajchman points out that 
Aronowitz argues that the struggle for recognition by an identity of a minority group, 
which cannot be fused or assimilated with the identity of the hegemonic group, can 
only begin a process where by the minority will be recognized as something other. 
Rajchman claims:  
Minority identity is not only tragic 
and hopeful; it also becomes problematizing 
when it mobilizes something other  
something which cannot be assimilated 
within visible, established, public categories, 
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 and which causes them to be rethought. 
(p.2)35 
 
Mizrahi women are officially invisible in the sense that legally their status is 
equal to that of Ashkenazi Jewish men. However, it is obvious to everyone who 
knows anything about Israel that this is simply not the case. As such the only option 
open to Mizrahi women is to organize themselves and engage in a political struggle to 
establish the recognition of their own identity. This is not a struggle for them to 
receive recognition that they are women+Mizrahi. They do not want to be recognized 
as simply belonging to these two groups. They have learnt from their own experience 
that when they have engaged in struggles either with Mizrahi men or with non-
Mizrahi women, that their specific agenda have not being addressed. In order for their 
agenda to be addressed they need to be recognized as comprising a separate social 
category with its own agenda and its own needs. The expression of their specific 
identity and the specific forms of discrimination suffered by Mizrahi women are only 
visible when Mizrahi women are seen to belong to a separate social category. Mizrahi 
women can only be themselves, and the types of discrimination they suffer can only 
be addressed, when Mizrahi women are seen to be a distinct group and not part of 
either the group of Mizrahim or the group of women in general. To repeat, the life 
experience of Mizrahi women has been constructed differently from that both of 
Mizrahi men and of non-Mizrahi women. Hence, the stage of organizing themselves 
for the struggle to place their agenda before the public involves a process of making 
clear to others that they have an identity which is separate from the two groups that 
people often classify them as belonging to. Obviously, Mizrahi women are not 
identified with the strongest womens groups in society and they are not directly 
competing with them for resources, because in such a competition they are bound to 
always loose. By the same token they are not in competition with the group of 
Ashkenazi men. Mizrahi women are in direct competition for resources with Mizrahi 
men and Ashkenzi women in the same sense that bus-drivers are in direct competition 
with taxi drivers and not with airplane pilots. The theoretical basis of their struggle is 
with the groups that Charles Taylor refers to as their significant other, which are 
somehow close to them but from which they are distinguishable.  
This type of struggle is in part essentially an antagonistic one because the 
group in question is fighting for the recognition of its own identity by differentiating 
itself from groups close to it. The struggle with these groups is a struggle for 
recognition both of who they are and also of who they are not: Mizrahi women are 
not Ashkenazi women and they are not Mizrahi men.  Their first step in the process to 
receive public recognition of who they are is to differentiate themselves from those 
groups they are close to and to which they are related. This negative struggle is but 
the first step the people must take in order to move away from the subordination 
Mouffe wrote about and from the reduction of their identity that Spelman wrote 
about. Mizrahi women must also engage in a struggle to identify themselves 
positively and this requires them to define themselves by saying who they are, in 
order to secure their recognition as comprising a separate social group. But their 
public recognition will only be secure when their existence is recognized by the law. 
As the law only recognizes groups that are defined positively Mizrahi women need to 
show that they have a specific form of life experiences with specific contents.  
Today, this struggle is carried on, like many other social struggles, only by 
small number of Mizrahi women who are organized in a non-governmental agency 
that calls itself Achoti (my sister). Achoti is only the latest organization in a number 
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 of organizations to take on this task. It was preceded by a number of other 
organizations since the early 1990s36. I want to stress that even today within 
organizations that are more powerful than Achoti, especially within womens 
organizations dominated by Ashkenazi women and within Mizrahi organizations 
dominated by Mizrahi men, Mizrahi women are not acknowledged as having their 
own distinct existence.  
The most important source for the content of the specific identity of Mizrahi 
women is their culture and history, a history that has yet to be written and which will 
obviously speak of their struggles against oppression and stereotyping as well as their 
struggle for liberation from poverty and misery, in their struggle against contempt and 
subordination of women who had to live in the shadows of their caricatured images of 
the Moroccan Freiha, the Oriental Aliza Mizrahi, the Yemenite Tziona and many 
other figures that are the stock and stable of Israeli culture and show business. In her 
book on Israeli cinema Ella Shohat presented the first analysis of the traditional role 
played by Mizrahi women in the Israeli film industry37. What she shows is that in 
Israeli films until the mid-Eighties the Mizrahi women was usually a figure of 
ridicule.  
The process by which Mizrahi women construct their identity and gain 
recognition for it involves them in a struggle against being articulated and defined by 
the hegemonic groups in society that Mouffe talks about. This process is a process of 
dialogue, combative dialogue. This combative dialogue takes place within what 
Taylor calls the politics of recognition. Engaging in this type of politics of 
recognition, will force Mizrahi women to recreate a new language of the body, of 
love, of art, of hate, of politics of women. This new language will be used by Mizrahi 
women to define their and fix their relations with members of other groups. This type 
of dialogue Taylor points out displays the relationships and ties that individuals have 
to others within a specific group and the relationships and ties that one group has to 
other groups. Hence, if until now Mizrahi women were forcibly positioned in 
subordinate relations, ridiculed by the culture and invisible not only to the law, but 
also in the political arena and to the history taught in schools, it follows that the 
dialogue that they are now engaged in is both with those groups close to them as well 
as to other groups in the society. This is not a dialogue in which they simply assert 
their differentiation from the groups close to them; it is also a dialogue in which they 
reconstruct their identity. I talk of recreate and reconstruct because this is not 
simply a nostalgic return to their roots, nor a process of romanticizing the memories 
of the good old days, but the construction of a form of identity that will give 
expression to their specific life experiences, as Mizrahi women who comprise a 
recognizable social and political group with its own differentiated status and that 
warrants recognition both by the law and by the Israeli public. The Mizrahi womens 
perception of sex, gender, motherhood, reproduction, family etc, distinguishes them 
from other groups of women in Israel. The stories they tell of their own experiences 
as Jewish women with roots in the Arab world, the traumas they went through 
following their Alyiah to Israel38 and even their pleasant experiences were all 
different from the stories told by Ashkenazi women or Mizrahi men. Their stories of 
Motherhood and of their familial attachments whose foundations are to be found both 
in Arab and Jewish History, influences their perception and experience of western 
civilization that they encountered in Israel. This is a subject that is only now 
beginning to be seriously studied (Dahan-Kalev, 2002). 
It is worthwhile to repeat so as to emphasize that the invisibility of Mizrahi 
women as a group does not imply anything with regard to the existence or absence of 
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 their story. The invisibility of the Mizrahi women only points to their absence in the 
official historical story of the state of Israel, and as a result of this absence, the 
political and the legal systems have failed to recognize them, and so they find 
themselves marginalized both economically and culturally, and also find themselves 
repressed in the sense that as a group their existence is not regarded as legitimate. The 
importance of the type of dialogue that Taylor speaks about in this context is that if it 
was practiced it would allow Mizrahi women to express themselves and eventually 
receive recognition as women who posses a specific form of consciousness, with its 
own specific history, with its own specific political and economic positioning, that at 
once has things in common with other groups but also possesses characteristics that 
are specifically their own. Since Mizrahi women have begun to take part in this type 
of dialogue some of them have found that their recognition for who they are does not 
constantly need to be proved. That is to say that taking part in this dialogue is in 
effect establishing them as an autonomous social category, differentiated from the 
general group of women and from Mizrahi men as well as other groups such Ultra-
orthodox women, Ethiopian women and Palestinian women.  
This process of dialogue carries within itself the capacity of expending the 
ability of Mizrahi women to give expression to what they think and so this process of 
dialogue works at the same time to undermine their discrimination. While they are 
engaged in the struggle they are also uncovering hidden aspects of their identity well 
as creating for themselves a place in political space. Then again the more Mizrahi 
women engage in this dialogue the more they will be capable of talking not just on 
behalf of themselves but also on behalf of other groups and so help open the doors for 
them to enter the public arena. So in creating their own political space in the public 
sphere by breaching the wall around it, Mizrahi women can an opening through 
which others can also pass. 
Prior to stating my conclusions I shall remind you of the principal themes of 
this paper. It began with a discussion of transparency of women in patriarchal social 
and political theories as they have been expressed in researches that focus on 
discrimination, marginalization of social groups even by researches who are clearly in 
favor of social reform. My point of reference has been Shlomo Swirskis Not 
Naturally Inept But Made to be Inept. While Swirski in his book deals with the 
problem of discrimination against Mizrahim and their marginalization within Israeli 
society, he displays gender blindness with regard to Mizrahi women treating them 
only as a part of the Mizrahim. In order to create recognition that Mizrahi women 
comprise a separate social category, they themselves must tell their own separate 
story historically, sociologically, politically, and culturally. Telling this story involves 
a political struggle which takes the form of a dialogue in order to construct the 
category of Mizrahi women as differentiated from categories into which they are 
dumped, like Mizrahim and women and entails them giving expression to their 
identity as Mizrahi women. Israeli law already recognizes women as comprising a 
group that is potentially subject to discrimination, and so it can come to their aid 
when they are discriminated against either economically, politically and socially. 
Mizrahi women of course fall within the category of women so the type of 
discrimination they suffer simply as women is amenable to legal defense. However, 
the discrimination they suffer as Mizrahi women is not amenable to legal defense 
because as Mizrahi women they are invisible to the law. Hence, in the struggle for 
their liberation in Israel Mizrahi women are partially dependent on the good will of 
the Ashkenazi feminist activists who began and still lead the struggle to improve the 
status of women in Israel. The first step that Mizrahi women have to perform to 
142Journal of International Womens Studies Vol 4 #3 May 2003                                                    
 address their special needs is to differentiate themselves from other groups of women. 
The second step in this struggle is to distinguish themselves from within the category 
of Mizrahim. This second step is more complicated then the first because whereas 
women are recognized as a social category by the law this is not the case with 
Mizrahim and this is something that is preventing the adoption of policies of 
affirmative action. The struggle for Mizrahim to receive the recognition that women 
possess as a group that is potentially subject to discrimination is a political power 
struggle that has been going on for years and for which there is no end in sight. 
Mizrahi women stand side by side with Mizrahi men in this struggle, however, their 
doing so has led to their special needs being swamped by the needs of the group as a 
whole. In the political activity of Mizrahim organized both within political parties and 
in NGOs Mizrahi women have always been, and continue to be, invisible. However, 
there is one Mizrahi organization, The Democratic Mizrahi Rainbow39, that displays 
some awareness of this problem in the sense that at least ideologically they pay some 
lips service to the special plight of Mizrahi women and attempt to give them equal 
representation wherever possible. But even this organization fails to give Mizrahi 
women the space they need to pursue their specific agenda. Hence, the only 
conclusion that Mizrahi women can draw is that they must differentiate themselves 
from Mizrahi men and pursue their own agenda in their own organizations. This 
differentiation of Mizrahi women to fight for their own recognition, if successful, 
would probably contribute to the wider group of Mizrahim also being recognized.  
 
Conclusion 
Three main conclusions seem to follow from my analysis: Firstly, exclusion, 
invisibility and discrimination are not only the results of a binary relation between the 
hegemonic group and subordinated groups. Phenomena of discrimination, exclusion 
and invisibility also occur within the subordinated groups themselves. Recognition 
and differentiation of the specific character of different subordinated groups, can only 
follow upon their setting up their own organizations, to pursue their own agenda, and   
by engaging in a political struggle. Secondly, recognition by the law and the adoption 
of government by policies of affirmative action are dependent on the success of a 
prior political struggle that paves the way for the public recognition that must precede 
legal recognition. Thirdly, because groups have been discriminated and marginalized 
this does not imply that they themselves have been immunized against performing 
acts of discrimination and marginalization themselves40. 
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